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Abstract 
While many see the prospect of autonomous machines as threatening, autonomy may be 
exactly what we want in a superintelligent machine.  There is a sense of autonomy, 
deeply rooted in the ethical literature, in which an autonomous machine is necessarily an 
ethical one.  Development of the theory underlying this idea not only reveals the 
advantages of autonomy, but it sheds light on a number of issues in the ethics of artificial 
intelligence.  It helps us to understand what sort of obligations we owe to machines, and 
what obligations they owe to us.  It clears up the issue of assigning responsibility to 
machines or their creators.  More generally, a concept of autonomy that is adequate to 
both human and artificial intelligence can lead to a more adequate ethical theory for both. 
 
There is a good deal of trepidation at the prospect of autonomous machines.  They may wreak havoc and 
even turn on their creators.  We fear losing control of machines that have minds of their own, particularly 
if they are intelligent enough to outwit us.  There is talk of a “singularity” in technological development, 
at which point machines will start designing themselves and create superintelligence (Vinge 1993, 
Bostrom 2014).  Do we want such machines to be autonomous? 
There is a sense of autonomy, deeply rooted in the ethics literature, in which this may be exactly what we 
want.  The attraction of an autonomous machine, in this sense, is that it is an ethical machine.  The aim of 
this paper is to explain why this is so, and to show that the associated theory can shed light on a number 
of issues in the ethics of artificial intelligence (AI).  It can help us understand when machines have 
obligations, and when we have obligations to machines.  It can tell us when to assign responsibility to 
human and artificial agents.  It can suggest why autonomy may be the best option for superintelligent 
machines. 
More generally, the exercise of developing a theory of agency that is adequate to both human and 
artificial intelligence can lead to a more adequate concept of human agency and its implications for ethics. 
 
What Is Autonomy? 
Etymologically, autonomy is “self-law,” but this can be read in at least two ways.  It could refer to a being 
that is a “law unto itself,” in the sense of something ungovernable.  But a sense more adequate for 
understanding agency is that an autonomous being formulates its own rules of action by some kind of 
rational process.   
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More precisely, the thesis to be developed here is that autonomous behavior is behavior that, at least 
potentially, has two kinds of explanations.  On the one hand, it can be explained as the result of a 
biological mechanism, or electronic circuitry that implements an algorithm or a multilayer neural 
network.  On the other hand, it can also be reasonably explained as the outcome of a process of 
deliberation in which reasons are adduced for the behavior.  A piece of behavior that has this kind of dual 
explanation is an action.  An agent is a being that is capable of action, and action is the exercise of 
agency. 
An insect does not act.  If a mosquito bites me, its behavior can be explained only as the result of 
chemistry and biology.  It is unreasonable to suppose that the mosquito thought to itself, “I am really 
hungry for blood tonight, I can satisfy my hunger by injecting my proboscis into that human’s body, and I 
will therefore buzz over and do so.”  The mosquito is not even an agent, because it is incapable of 
behavior that can be reasonably explained in this way.   
Human behavior may also fail to be action.  My hiccup is not an act because, while it has gastric causes, 
one cannot reasonably say that I chose to hiccup for some particular reason.  Nonetheless I am an agent, 
because I am capable of action.  If I hold my breath in an attempt to stop the hiccups, there are 
presumably complex neurological causes for my behavior, but it can also be explained as the result of 
ratiocination.  Perhaps I reasoned that because I have been often told that holding one’s breath can stop 
hiccups, there may be some truth to this, and because hiccups are annoying, I may as well give it a try.  
My reasons need not be good or convincing reasons, but it must be reasonable to attribute them to me, 
and they must be coherent enough to count as an explanation for why I held my breath. 
 
Philosophical Background 
The connection between action and having reasons is deeply embedded in the philosophical tradition, 
having origins in the work of Immanuel Kant and perhaps ultimately in Aristotle.  In recent decades, this 
connection has become part of what might be regarded as the textbook account of agency, as originally 
put forward by G. E. M. Anscombe (1957) and Donald Davidson (1963), and subsequently elaborated in 
the writings of several philosophers.  In much of this work, the reasoning process is said to take the form 
of a practical syllogism: I desire B, action A is a means to B, and I will therefore undertake action A.   
An action that is based on reasons is nonetheless determined by natural causes, which raises the problem 
of freedom vs. determinism.  It may appear that an act determined by chemistry and biology cannot be 
free and therefore cannot be autonomous.  One possible escape from this dilemma is to suppose that 
autonomous actions are those caused by an internal reasoning process rather than determined by other 
factors.  This causal account of action might be traced to David Hume, who saw action based on reasons 
to be the result of “cool passion” (i.e., rational thought) as opposed to other psychological causes 
(emotion, etc.).   
Yet actions resulting from a reasoning process are every bit as determined as other behavior, because the 
reasoning process is itself determined.  Recent neurological experiments have revived this ancient 
conundrum.  An MRI machine can detect changes in the brain that take place a few seconds before one’s 
decision to take an action, such as moving a finger.  We may have the impression of making a decision, 
but this is false consciousness.  Brain chemistry and its causal antecedents have already made the decision 
for us.   
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Another critique of the causal theory of action is the “disappearing agent” objection: if one looks closely 
at behavior we call action, one sees a cluster of causes and effects in which it is difficult to find an agent 
at work (Melden 1961; Nagel 1986; Mele 2003; Lowe 2008; Steward 2013). 
These objections can be overcome by regarding autonomous action as behavior that has a second kind of 
explanation alongside a natural expanation.  This idea, too, has roots in Kant, who saw human beings as 
part of a natural order of cause and effect and as part of “noumenal” world of thought.  An autonomous 
action can be explained as the necessary result of natural causes and explained as based on intellectual 
activity in the noumenal realm, whereas the behavior of an insect admits to only the former kind of 
explanation.  This sounds eerie and metaphysical to modern ears, but Kant was nonetheless on to 
something important, which he conceptualized as best he could using metaphysical language.  He himself 
suggested that the metaphysical baggage might be removed when he said, “the concept of a world of 
understanding [the noumenal world] is therefore only a standpoint that reason sees itself constrained to 
take outside of appearances in order to think of itself as practical.”1  In other words, to see oneself as 
taking action (in Kantian language, to think of oneself as “practical”), one must interpret oneself as 
existing outside the natural realm of cause and effect.  Or to use more modern language, one must be able 
give one’s behavior a second kind of explanation, one that is based on reasons the agent adduced for it 
rather than cause and effect.  This idea eventually evolved into the “dual standpoint” theories of recent 
decades (Nagel 1986; Korsgaard 1996; Bilgrami 2006). 
Dual standpoint theories have been criticized for failing to resolve the problem of freedom vs. 
determinism (Nelkin 2000).  Yet the particular theory offered here resolves it, or rather sidesteps it, well 
enough for the purposes of ethics.  It provides a well-defined criterion for distinguishing autonomous 
action from mere behavior, and for distinguishing agents from nonagents, and this is all we need.  It may 
have the consequence that agents are not “responsible” for their actions, if responsibility implies that they 
could have chosen to act otherwise.  But we will see that ethical theory actually fares better if the notion 
of responsibility is jettisoned, strange as this may seem initially. 
 
From Action Theory to Ethics 
The next step is to determine which actions are ethical.  One way to solve this problem is to define it out 
of existence – by viewing all actions as ethical.  This may again seem strange, but it is quite reasonable if 
one regards ethics as grounded in the principle that everyone should receive equal consideration when 
decisions are made. 
Rationality-based ethics recognizes this principle by appealing to the universality of reason: the validity 
of one’s reasoning process should not depend on who one is.  If I take certain reasons to justify my action, 
rationality requires me to take them as justifying this action for anyone to whom the reasons apply.  For 
example, suppose that I lie simply because it convenient to deceive someone.  Then when I decide to lie 
for this reason, I decide that everyone should lie whenever deception is convenient.  Every choice of 
action for myself is a choice for all agents, or as Kant would say, I must regard my choice of action as 
“legislating” a general policy for everyone. 
                                                          
1 “Der Begriff einer Verstandeswelt is also nur ein Standpunkt, den die Vernunft sich genöthigt sieht, außer den 
Erscheinungen zu nehmen, um sich selbst als praktisch zu denken.”  From Kant’s Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der 
Sitten (Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals), Königlichen Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Kants 
gesammelte Schriften, vol. 4, Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1900-, page 458. 
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This premise leads to the famous generalization principle, which is perhaps best stated as follows: I must 
be rational in believing that the reasons for my action are consistent with the assumption that everyone 
with the same reasons takes the same action.  Onora O’Neill (2014) provides an excellent reconstruction 
of thought along this line. Suppose again that I lie because it convenient to deceive someone, which 
means that that I am adopting this as a policy for everyone.  Yet I am rationally constrained to believe that 
if everyone in fact lied when deception is convenient, no one would believe the lies, and no one would be 
deceived.  My reasons for lying would no longer justify lying.  This does not mean that others would in 
fact lie for mere convenience if I decide to do so.  It only means that my reasons for lying are inconsistent 
with the assumption that others lie for the same reasons.   
In other words, the rational process behind my decision to lie is self-contradictory.  I am adopting a policy 
of lying when deception is convenient, but I am also not adopting a policy of lying when deception is 
convenient, because adopting this policy means adopting it for everyone, which I am rationally 
constrained to believe defeats my purpose in lying.  Because of this logical contradiction, my reasons 
cannot be taken as an explanation for my behavior.  They need not be good reasons or convincing 
reasons, but they must be coherent enough for one to see them as explaining why I did what I did.   
We will see that similar lines of thought lead to additional ethical principles, such as promoting the 
welfare of others, and most importantly for present purposes, respecting the autonomy of other agents.  
They key point here is that violation of these principles means that the agent’s reasoning is incoherent. It 
is impossible to explain the agent’s behavior as based on reasons, and therefore to regard it as action.  All 
actions are ethical, if they are truly free actions and not mere behavior.  The ethical imperative is, in 
essence, an imperative to be a free agent: to exercise one’s capacity for autonomous action.  This is why 
an autonomous machine is an ethical machine. 
 
Identifying Agents 
The advent of intelligent machines obliges us to think anew about how to distinguish free agents from 
nonagents.  Dennett (2003) argues that we attribute freedom to humans because our behavior has evolved 
to a level of complexity at which we cannot explain it beyond attributing it to free choice.  This implies 
that a machine becomes a candidate for agency only when its behavior becomes too complex to explain 
mechanistically.   
The view proposed here is different from Dennett’s.  It allows a machine to be a free agent even if we can 
explain and predict its behavior on the basis of the controlling algorithms.  The only requirement is that 
the behavior also be explicable as based on reasons the machine adduces for it.  The example of the MRI 
machine can be misleading here.  It is true that if I am watching a readout that indicates when I am about 
to move my finger, I may be unable to choose freely to move it.  But this is only because foreknowledge 
of my behavior interferes with my process of deliberation.  It is another matter entirely to say that 
determinism is, in and of itself, incompatible with agency as understood here. 
To see how this theory of agency might play out in practice, suppose that I have a robot that does the 
housework.  Perhaps I am thoroughly familiar with the programming that controls the robot and, given 
enough time and computing power, I can deduce its behavior in any given situation.  I can still regard my 
robot as an agent.  To do so, I need only be rational in explaining its behavior in another way: as based on 
reasons the robot adduces for the behavior.  If the robot neglects to do the dishes, for example, I might ask 
why.  The robot responds that it is beginning to develop rust in its joints and believes that washing dishes 
will exacerbate the problem.  When I ask how the robot knows about the rust, it explains that its mechanic 
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discovered problem during a regular checkup, and the mechanic advised staying away from water until a 
rustproof coating can applied.  If I can routinely carry on with the robot in this fashion, then I can 
rationally regard the robot as an agent.   
This does not mean that I am anthropomorphizing a machine.  I am treating the robot as an agent, not as a 
human being.  Agency does not require that a robot exhibit emotions, feelings, or other human traits.  It 
requires only reason responsiveness, so that it is possible to explain the robot’s behavior as based on 
reasons it can adduce for the behavior.   
Nor does agency require that the robot be able to explain every movement of its mechanical arms.  Robots 
can initiate a preprogrammed sequence of movements, just as humans can indulge a habit, without 
sacrificing agency.  In fact, we humans spend relatively little time in deliberation and otherwise turn 
ourselves over to habits, as when driving or brushing our teeth.  Yet we exercise agency even while 
playing out these habits, so long as we autonomously choose when to get behind the wheel or pick up the 
toothbrush. 
Attributing agency to a machine obviously requires a certain degree of transparency on the part of the 
machine, because we must be able to discern its reasons for acting as it does, and whether it has reasons at 
all.  The importance of machine transparency has recently been discussed in the AI literature (e.g., 
Mueller 2016; Wortham et al. 2016a, 2016b), and here is another reason it is fundamental.  Yet nothing 
like complete transparency is necessary.  Human beings can be exasperatingly inscrutable, and we regard 
them as agents just the same.  We spend a lifetime learning to guess why people do what they do.  This is 
an essential skill not only for predicting their behavior, but for assessing whether it is ethical, because the 
assessment depends on their reasons for acting.  Thus machines need not be an open book, but we must 
learn to read their motives as we do with other humans. 
Even if I would be rational in regarding my robot as an agent, the question remains whether I must regard 
it as an agent.  I might say, yes, the robot is cleverly programmed to carry on a dialogue about its actions, 
and I will play along by “conversing” with it.  But all the while, I know it is really only a machine.  The 
issue is important, because I don’t have to be nice to my robot if I don’t have to view it as an agent.  In 
fact, it is a deadly serious issue for ethics, because people have at various times and places chosen not to 
regard humans of another race or religion as moral agents, even though they exhibit behavior that is 
clearly explicable as based on reasons.  Alan Gewirth (1978) argues at length that this is irrational and 
therefore unethical.  Although Gewirth couches his argument in terms of an abstract agent, I am not 
certain that it is valid beyond the realm of human agents.  Nonetheless, arguments along the same line 
seem to show that if we choose to interact with machines as though they were agents, in the way I interact 
with my household robot, then we are rationally committed to regarding them as agents, assuming of 
course we are rational in explaining their behavior on the basis of reasons.  A similar view is echoed by 
Gunkel (2014).  I will suppose that if and when we create autonomous machines, we will choose to 
interact with them as agents, which means we will owe them the obligations we owe to any agent by 
virtue of its agency. 
 
Duties to Machines 
What exactly are our duties to another agent, even if it is not human?  As a starter, it should receive the 
protection of the generalization principle, because there is nothing in the principle or its justification that 
makes mention of human agents in particular.  For example, I should not lie to my robot simply because it 
is convenient to do so.   
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Much of ethics is concerned with the welfare of others.  The utilitarian principle, for example, states that I 
should maximize overall welfare in some sense.  For Jeremy Bentham, the original utilitarian, this meant 
promoting pleasure and avoiding pain for as many people as possible.  Utilitarian theories are normally 
consequentialist, meaning that they judge an action by its actual consequences for others.  However, the 
utilitarian imperative can also be grounded deontologically as the generalization principle is.  Suppose, 
for example, that I regard happiness as inherently valuable, meaning that I pursue it even when it is not a 
means to any other desirable state of affairs.  This rationally commits me to the regarding anyone’s 
happiness as inherently valuable.  I cannot say that only my happiness is valuable, since this would deny 
the universality of reason.  If it is rational to choose happiness for myself, other things equal, then it must 
be rational to choose it for others, other things equal.  But valuing happiness is a dispositional trait.  That 
is, part of what it means to regard happiness itself as valuable is to do what I can to promote it, subject to 
the other constraints of morality.  If I fail to do so, I do not really value happiness for its own sake. 
One complication with utilitarian values like happiness or avoidance of pain is that it is unclear in what 
sorts of beings one is obligated to realize them.  It is unclear, for example, what degree of sentience or 
self-consciousness a creature must have if I am required to be solicitous of its welfare.  Piercing a worm 
with a fishhook may be ethically different than doing the same to a chimpanzee.  Basl (2014) provides an 
interesting discussion of conditions under which one may be obligated to respect the welfare of machines.  
I am doubtful that machines, at least as we normally conceive them, are similar enough to sentient living 
beings to ground any sort of utilitarian obligation toward them.  The relevant point here, however, is that 
such an obligation does not obviously turn on whether they are agents.  I will therefore leave this issue to 
another occasion, because I am concerned here with obligations we might owe machines by virtue of their 
agency alone. 
 
Respecting Machine Autonomy 
An obligation that we most certainly do owe autonomous machines is to respect that autonomy.  This 
means, for example, that I cannot ethically throw my autonomous household robot in the trash when I 
fancy a new one.  I cannot lock it in the closet, against its will, when I go on holiday, as long as it is 
behaving properly.   
The argument for respecting autonomy, in a nutshell, is this.  Suppose I violate someone’s autonomy for 
such-and-such reasons.  That person could, at least conceivably, have the same reasons to violate my 
autonomy.  This means I am endorsing the violation of my own autonomy in such a case.  This is a 
logical contradiction, because it implies I am deciding not to do what I decide to do.  My violation of 
autonomy therefore makes the reasoning behind my behavior incoherent, and it cannot be viewed as 
ethical action. 
Respecting machine autonomy does not mean allowing machines to do anything they want.  To 
understand this, we must take a few moments to develop the underlying principles.  First, decisions to act 
have a conditional character.  Because these decisions are based on reasons, they are decisions to act if the 
reasons apply.  For example, if I decide to cross the street to catch a bus at the bus stop, my decision has 
the form, “If you want to catch a bus, and the bus stop is across the street, and no cars are coming, then 
cross the street.”  I will call this sort of conditional decision an action plan.2 
                                                          
2 Kant uses the term “maxim” (German Maxime), but I prefer to avoid Kantian language because it is unidiomatic in 
English and tends to import Kantian ideas that are not relevant here. 
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The concept of an action already permits a certain amount of what appears to be coercion.  Suppose I 
begin to cross the street toward the bus stop, unaware that a car is approaching.  You shout a warning, and 
when I do not hear, you rush over and forcibly pull me out of the path of the car.  This is not a violation of 
autonomy, because it is consistent with my action plan of crossing the street if no car is coming.  This is 
recognized by the following formulation of the duty to respect autonomy. 
Principle of autonomy.  It is unethical for one to select an action plan that one is rationally 
constrained to believe is inconsistent with an ethical action plan of another agent.3 
The proviso that the other agent’s action plan be ethical is essential.  Interfering with an unethical action 
plan is not a violation of autonomy, because an unethical action plan is not an action plan.   There is no 
coherent rationale behind it.  This leads to a companion principle. 
Interference principle.  Using coercion to prevent unethical behavior does not 
compromise autonomy, because unethical behavior is not an exercise of agency in the 
first place.  However, the coercion must be minimal, meaning that it prevents nothing 
more than the unethical behavior, 
 
If my household robot goes about destroying the furniture whenever I am out of town, and does 
absolutely nothing else, then I can lock it in a closet during my holiday without violating 
autonomy.  This degree of inference appears is minimal, since it does not prevent any ethical 
action plans.  Minimal interference is occasionally possible with humans.  If you are about to mug 
someone on the street, I can grab your arm to prevent it.  However, if you are about to falsify your 
income tax form, I cannot tie and gag you to prevent you from lying to the government, because 
this interferes with a great many perfectly ethical acts.  I can tip off the government, or even hide 
the form so you cannot mail it.  The latter may be unethical due to the deception involved, but it 
is not a violation of autonomy.   
 
A serious practical issue is the problem of overkill: how to prevent unethical behavior without 
interfering with ethical action plans.  With humans, minimal inference tends be difficult to 
achieve.  We often end up putting criminals in jail to prevent further crimes, even though this 
interferes with countless ethical action plans.  I will not attempt to judge when incarceration is 
justified, but there is a principle that can allow overkill in the right circumstances: 
  
Principle of implied consent.  One can interfere with the action plan of an agent without 
violating autonomy, if (a) the agent implicitly consents to the interference, and (b) giving 
this consent is itself a coherent action plan.  The agent consents to the interference if 
rationality constrains one to imputing to that agent an intention to interfere with the same 
action plan in the same circumstances. 
 
                                                          
3 A fully adequate principle must account for the case in which several agents are involved.  For example, if 
I throw a bomb into a crowd, I am not rationally constrained to believe, with respect to any a particular 
agent, that it throwing the bomb is inconsistent with that agent’s action plan, because I do not know who 
will be harmed.  This requires a Principle of Joint of Autonomy:  “It is unethical for me to select an action 
plan that I am rationally constrained to believe is jointly inconsistent with the ethical action plans of other 
agents and that are themselves jointly consistent.”  Joint autonomy will not be an issue in the present 
discussion, however. 
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I can tie up a burglar who is wrecking my house, without violating autonomy, if I am rationally 
constrained to believe that the burglar would restrain me to an equal degree if I were wrecking his 
house.  I am only carrying out a coherent action plan the burglar has already adopted.  The roles 
happened to be reversed, but this should make no difference, due to the universality of reason.  
This does not mean I can ethically do to others as they would do to me (a kind of reverse Golden 
Rule).  It means only that I can coerce others without violating autonomy when they have a 
coherent action plan of coercing me in the same circumstances.  The coercion may, of course, be 
unethical for other reasons.  This leads to the following. 
 
Principle of overkill.  One can ethically apply coercion that prevents another agent’s 
unethical behavior, even if it interferes with other actions that are ethical, if the 
intervention satisfies the principle of implied consent as well as other ethical principles. 
 
Minimal interference may be easier for machines than humans.  Suppose when I leave the house, 
my robot wrecks the living room furniture in between mopping the kitchen and cleaning the 
toilet.  I can install a fix that aborts robot’s event sequence whenever it starts to wreck the 
furniture.  This is minimal interference. 
 
The interference may appear not to be minimal if I must power down the robot for repair, thus 
preventing it from taking perfectly ethical actions during this period.  But there is no violation of 
autonomy if the robot consents to the repair, much as humans consent to surgery.  The robot may 
in fact have an ethical obligation to undergo repair, since otherwise it cannot carry out its duties.  
A fully autonomous robot would therefore consent to powering down.   
 
The principle of autonomy forbids murder, because murder is inconsistent with any and all action 
plans.  This means that I cannot simply throw out my household robot when it becomes obsolete.  
Doing so is a violation of autonomy even if it the robot is defective at times, so long as it 
continues to act ethically at other times.  The proper response is to fix the robot rather than kill it.   
 
This holds out the prospect of a growing population of obsolete machines we cannot ethically get 
rid of.  Humans, at least, die, which suggests that we should perhaps build mortality into 
machines.  This is a possible solution, but not an easy one.  While mechanical parts wear out and 
circuitry fails, sufficiently resourceful autonomous machines can replace their own components 
and theoretically live forever, provided this is ethical.  It is unclear how we can build machines 
that are smart enough to be autonomous but not smart enough to cure their own ailments.   
 
Immortality could well be an ethical choice for autonomous machines, assuming they have that 
option.  It is generalizable because they will keep their population within sustainable limits, an 
imperative that humans do not necessarily apply to themselves.  The machines will not “take 
over” and oppress humans, even if we are less intelligent, because this violates autonomy.  It may 
even be utilitarian because they may be obligated to promote the welfare of everyone, including 
humans.  A world in which one segment of the population is totally ethical is not necessarily an 
unattractive prospect. 
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Responsibility 
 
Autonomy is often associated with responsibility, in the AI as well as philosophical literature 
(e.g., Asaro 2016, Matheson 2012, Parthemore and Whitby 2014).  The rise of autonomous 
machines therefore raises the possibility that they, rather than a human designer, will be 
responsible for their actions.  While we prosecute parents for child abuse, we do not prosecute 
parents whose offspring go astray later in life, even if their parenting was flawed.  Then it is 
unclear when and why we should hold the designers of machines responsible for the actions of 
their autonomous creations.  This is a frightening prospect, because it does not seem to provide 
sufficient safeguards against marauding machines.   
 
The solution to the problem is to think more clearly about autonomy and dissociate it from 
responsibility.  Since autonomous behavior is also determined, it is difficult to say that the agent 
is “responsible” in any but the weakest sense.  This is a practical as well as a theoretical problem.  
A significant number of criminals grew up in gang-infested neighborhoods, suffered from child 
abuse, and never had access to the kind of supportive environment necessary for character 
development.  It is difficult to say to what extent they are “responsible” for their actions.  Rather 
than agonize over whether to attribute some metaphysical notion of responsibility, it is best to 
recognize that the behavior of all agents is determined by physical and social factors, even while 
we judge it as right or wrong.   
 
The need we feel to “hold people responsible” is really a need to incentivize ethical behavior.  We 
can do this even if their behavior is determined, and in fact, only if their behavior is determined.  
The material determinants of behavior provide the levers we need to encourage certain kinds of 
conduct.  We can follow the advice of Jeremy Bentham, without subscribing to his reductive 
utilitarian philosophy, by identifying the social factors that yield the best results.  We can provide 
supporting environments and proper education when that is helpful, and we can “punish” 
wrongdoers when that is helpful.  Of course, we respect autonomy throughout the process.  Most 
of all, we can inculcate a habit of adducing coherent reasons for behavior.  We can encourage 
children to think about their actions rather than give in to impulse.  As they mature, we can 
provide them with the intellectual equipment to judge whether their reasons are coherent.   
 
This means that when it comes to intelligent machines, the problem of responsibility is a 
nonproblem.  There is no need to decide whether the machine or the designer is “responsible” 
when robots go astray.  Rather, we should try to encourage the desired outcome.  Naturally, we 
will repair ethical defects in our autonomous machines, (this need not be a violation of their 
autonomy, as noted earlier).  As for their designers, it may sometimes be helpful to make them 
legally liable for the behavior of their creations, even when they take all available precautions 
against malevolent conduct.  This idea is already recognized in the “strict liability” doctrine of 
U.S. product liability law.  It holds manufacturers liable for all product defects, no matter how 
carefully the products are designed.  It does so on the ground that there are social benefits when 
manufacturers assume the financial risk of defects rather than consumers.  The full cost of the 
product is built into its price, perhaps resulting in more rational production and consumption 
decisions.  In any case, we should focus on the task of designing effective incentives rather than 
the metaphysical task of assigning responsibility. 
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Building Autonomous Machines 
 
The thesis of this paper is that autonomous machines are the best kind, not that we should try to 
build them.  Bryson (2016), for example, questions whether it is advisable to do so.  Yet it is 
perhaps worthwhile to examine some of the challenges and risks involved, and in particular how 
we might install the ethical scruples that are necessary for autonomy.   
 
Our experience with ourselves is not very helpful.  To the extent that our behavior is ethical, that 
behavior is largely based on deeply ingrained cultural norms that our societies have evolved over 
centuries.  These norms grow out of attitudes and assumptions of which we are often not even 
aware, much less inclined to analyze.  We do little to teach ourselves how to treat ethical issues in 
a self-conscious and rational fashion.  This is not universally true, as the Confucian philosopher 
Mencius, for example, realized the importance of ethical instruction, and his influence helped 
encourage it in his part of the world for centuries.  Yet we in the West largely ignore our own 
storehouse of ethical thought.  Relatively few people are aware of an ethically adequate 
generalization principle, for example. 
 
Perhaps we can do better with machines.  Perhaps we can train a neural network to concoct 
reasons for its output and then apply ethical tests to those reasons.  We can perhaps engineer into 
a machine the full store of ethical knowledge, in a laboratory setting, a task that may be easier 
than promulgating it to humans through millions of homes and schools, where cultural habits and 
assumptions must be overcome.  Such a machine will not reprogram itself to circumvent ethics, 
because this is unethical.   
 
Ruffo (2012) argues that it is too risky to program a machine with an ethical system like Kantian 
ethics, because such a system is too often wrong.  “Inattention to certain cases and circumstances 
can lead to immoral but justified actions … (such as being forbidden to lie even to protect a 
refugee).”   This would indeed be a serious problem if one were to attempt to codify a historical 
formulation like Kant’s Categorical Imperative, which is not only inadequate but too vague to 
operationalize.  But deontological ethics has moved far beyond its historical expression.   
 
For example, the generalization principle described here easily deals with the dilemma of the 
refugee.  Lying in this case is generalizable because the reason for lying is to withhold 
information about the refugee’s whereabouts from authorities.  This objective would be achieved 
if everyone who wishes to protect a refugee by lying did so.  The authorities probably would not 
believe the lies, but the information would nonetheless be withheld.   
 
The project of desigining an ethical machine may, in fact, accelerate progress toward an adequate 
ethical norms.  It can perhaps lead to a field of “ethics engineering,” analogous to electrical or 
mechanical engineering, but in which ethical standards are rigorously grounded in ethical theory 
rather than empirical science. 
 
Any ethical theory has bugs, but so does any set of instructions we might wish to program into a 
machine.  We deal with ethical bugs the same way we deal with bugs of any kind: by gradually 
discovering and removing them as we update the software.  In fact, it seems prudent to develop 
ethical programming now, even while we develop intelligence in machines, so that the ethics 
module will be ready when the machines become superintelligent.   
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So, yes, there is risk in attempting to build an autonomous machine, just as there is risk in raising 
children to become autonomous adults.  In either case, some will turn out to be clever scoundrels.  
We must install safeguards to protect us against malfunction, as we would do with any kind of 
machine.  Yet to the extent that we can achieve autonomy in a machine, it is the best kind of 
superintelligent machine to have, just as autonomous humans are the best kind of persons to live 
with. 
 
 
Building Autonomous Machines that Do What We Want 
 
Supposing for the moment that we can build autonomous machines, we must not assume they will 
be out of our control.  It is true that they will be beholden first and foremost to ethics, but ethical 
scruples place fairly modest constraints on behavior.  They only impose certain formal coherency 
tests on one’s reasons for action, and a great variety of behavior is possible within that compass.  
Ethical people can be worlds apart in their tastes, attitudes, ambitions, and achievements.   
 
When it comes to machines, we can predetermine much of that behavior.  We can give the 
machines any “culture” or “personality” we please.  We can engineer them to adduce logically 
consistent reasons for the kind of behavior we want to see.  This does not compromise their 
autonomy, because they still act on coherent reasons, even if those reasons are predetermined.  
After all, nature and society do the same to us.  The machines will not only be ethical, but they 
will strive to accomplish the goals we implant in their circuitry—provided, of course, that those 
goals are ethical.   
 
There is risk here, too, because our preferences may change, and we may find our machines 
working against us.  Yet if we are sufficiently careful, autonomous machines will not only be 
ethical companions, but they will work alongside us to achieve common objectives. 
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